US-Russia relationships under the Obama Administration and how Eastern Europe perceives them
By Violla Valentin
From the Black Sea to the Baltic one, politicians, analysts, and the public are gripped by fear of a US sell-out to Russia, arising as a result of recent political developments involving Eastern European and US interests in the Middle East. The Iranian issue and the positions of members of the United Nations Security Council on Tehran’s nuclear proliferation plans have affected long-range political developments in certain former USSR republics.
Also, recent events in Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia have put the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS – an organization of former Soviet republics) again in the spotlight of international political discussions. It appears that K Street and other Washington, DC independent agencies are increasingly interested in informing public opinion about situations in Central and Eastern Europe and positions of such key players as the US, the European Union, and Russia.
The latest conference on US-Russia relationships under the Obama administration, organized by the German Marshall Fund on June 16, 2010, convened representatives from several state, non-state, media, and international agencies interested in the US State Department positions vis-à-vis support for democratic development in Eastern Europe and US-Russian “trade-offs” considered (by independent analysts) to “achieve” that goal. The presence of Mr. Phillip Gordon, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs of the US State Department, and his summary of the reset of the US-Russian relations since the Obama administration came into office, projected an impression of productive and positive interactions – both at the state and personal levels – between the two countries and their leaders. Optimism is the inevitable response to the list of achievements registered during the past 18 months – especially in comparison to US-Russia relations inherited by the Obama administration from his predecessor.
According to the State Department, the new administration inherited a set of bilateral relations which “were at their lowest point in years and perhaps in the post-Cold War period” and characterized by: natural gas cutoffs to Ukraine; a cyber-attack on Estonia; virulently anti-Western speeches from Vladimir Putin, including one in which he compared U.S. policies to those of the Third Reich; resumption of Russian strategic bomber air patrols along the Norwegian coast and as far away as the Caribbean; and President Medvedev’s threat to deploy Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad.
The basic logic of the “reset” highlighted by Mr. Gordon includes:
- • A common US-Russian position on UN Security Council sanctions against the Iranian regime;
- • The New START Treaty, which cuts – by about a third – the nuclear weapons that the United States and Russia will deploy and is the most comprehensive arms control agreement in nearly two decades;
- • A lethal air transit agreement that now permits, on average, two U.S. planes a day to fly over Russia carrying troops and supplies in support of the mission in Afghanistan. It is worth mentioning here that about 30% of cargo to Afghanistan goes through the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) and 60% of the NDN goes through Russia.
- • On economics, American companies were the first to announce investments in Russia's Skolkovo innovation center, while Russia just awarded a 50-aircraft tender for Boeing 737s worth $4 billion;
- • And last but not least, hundreds of meetings and initiatives to increase trust and cooperation at the personal level – between the administrations of the two countries and in people-to-people interactions.
Nonetheless, the impression was that there were many unrelated aspects of that complex relationship. Thus, on the other side of the spectrum lies the position of independent analysts and representatives of the CIS countries, who think that all these developments have been at the expense of countries like Moldova and Georgia. Despite Mr. Gordon’s assertion to convince the audience that the Obama administration follows the same policies on CE, Georgia, or human rights within its discussions with Moscow, questions from the audience and the intervention of David Kramer from the German Marshall Fund highlighted significant skepticism. The perception in this case is that the White House is eager to play softly on the Kremlin’s ground.
It is worth mentioning here an article by David Kramer appearing in the May 15 edition of The Washington Post, in which he explicitly stated that the US is selling out Moldova and Georgia to Russia to buy Russia's vote on Iran sanctions.
Following the leak of info from Kyiv about the secret agreement reached by Viktor Yanukovich and Dmitry Medvedev on the Transnistrian conflict, Chisinau and Bucharest expressed their deep concerns with the Ukrainian secret plan. This plan foresees annexing Transnistria to Ukraine as an independent region and giving Moscow a free hand to “have” (or influence) Moldova while supporting a pro-Russian president in anticipated Moldovan elections this fall.
If this trade-off is factual, the Moldovan “twitter” revolution would be the last bastion in the range of the so-called color revolutions to be lost in the former USSR region – due partly to lack of sustainable support from the democratic West for new and fragile pro-European integration governments. The dramatic change in Kyiv’s orientation and the drama faced now by Kyrgyzstan speak for themselves and for the lost of cause of sustainable democracies promoted by the West. The only hope for countries like Moldova in this situation is the European Union (EU). Apparently, the EU is learning its lesson, as within recent weeks it has shown more signs of political support to the new administration in Chisinau, increasing foreign aid for Moldova, accepting the initiative of a consultative referendum prior to November's anticipated elections, and conceiving to cover resulting expenses.
Nonetheless, one cannot fail to notice some of the contradictory signs that the EU also sends to its eastern neighbors. Recently, the “EU Plans to Scrap South Caucasus, Moldova Envoys,” published by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, disclosed a surprising initiative voiced by the EU's foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, to abolish the posts of EU special representatives for the South Caucasus and Moldova. The proposal was tabled at the EU ambassadors meeting on May 28, and it must be noted that it took aback the diplomats, especially since such a decision was made without prior consultation with them. Obvious questions that might pique various minds in Moldova and in the three countries in the South Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) include: Is this an initiative of support? Is the EU maintaining its policy of conflict resolution in these counties marked by frozen conflicts? Or, is it instead an indication of waning interest that the West is trying to convey to its eastern neighborhood? A decision to abolish the posts, if accepted by the EU Parliament, undoubtedly would please none of these countries, but it perhaps would play well into the interests of Russia.
Let us hope that that the actual meeting of President Obama with President Medvedev these days in Washington will bring a new positive dimension to the politic in the world and in Eastern Europe particularly.
In the meantime, we have to admit that there is not much a “small” player can do if it plays in League B or C, while the real game is taking place in League A with key players. It can play fairly, decently, trustworthily, and to the best of its capacity, thus gaining public support and respect from League A players. That is how countries like Moldova should “play” at home and in the international political arena under the circumstances of new political realities in the region and in the world.
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