U.S.-Poland Agenda: From Strategic Partnership to Velvet Divorce?
By Olaf Osica
Across the globe, the election of President Barack Obama engendered a wave of hope and trust in the U.S. foreign policy agenda. In Central and Eastern Europe, however, a dose of an anxiety has colored this sense of optimism. Vice President Joe Biden’s desire to press the “reset button” in U.S.-Russian relations, followed by President Obama’s letter to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, in which the White House offered to open a new chapter in the U.S.-Russian cooperation, unveiled a great deal of mistrust among America’s allies in Central Europe.
Most observers were tempted to explain this view by noting Central Europe’s tendency to perceive Republican foreign policy as tough and value-driven. In turn, political elites in the region tend to view Democrats dubiously and somewhat prone to sacrificing values for short-term policy goals. Even though the Democratic administration of Bill Clinton expanded NATO (against the wishes of reluctant European allies), memories of his “Russia-first policy” still cast a shadow over regional perceptions of the Democrats’ foreign policy agenda. This simplified explanation encloses U.S.-Central Europe relations within a static paradigm of historical traumas, weighting perceptions over policies. In order to fully grasp the nature of America’s relations with “New Europe,” one needs to be unsentimental.
Unlike the previous administration, President Obama’s tenure poses a serious challenge for Central Europe. Symbolically, it marks the end of the era for “New Europe” and the end of America’s privileged attention to the region. This focus resulted more from the virtue of being “new democracies,” rather than the genuine contribution such countries could make towards a global policy agenda. The transition is occurring at a time of profound, structural changes in international politics. In this uncertain moment, Central Europe must navigate through the unsettled waters of European security without relying on the United States as a leader. While many in the region have regarded this situation as a “nightmare scenario,” the change is most visible in Poland.
After years of political honeymoon, the relationship between Poland and the United States has entered a political void. Poland and the United States remain NATO allies. The restoration of American power in world politics undoubtedly brings more security for both Europe and Poland. But the partnership that developed in the 1990s – an added value to Poland’s membership in NATO – seems to be definitely loosing momentum. Following Poland’s bitter experience in Iraq, the prospect of an anti-missile shield in the country restored a sense of common interests – but only for a while.
In Poland, ratification of the Missile Defense agreement of August 2008 is contingent on America’s decision to deploy the system in Europe. An associated political declaration on strategic cooperation – signed alongside the agreement – should logically be put on hold until that time. However, suspending this declaration has higher political costs for the United States than delaying construction on the shield itself. Therefore, Washington has an incentive to prolong the ambiguity around the European anti-missile system in order to leverage its policy towards Russia and Iran. Should this strategy bring results, the United States may opt for an elegant exit strategy from missile defense, transferring instead a (perhaps) unarmed Patriot missile battery to Poland. This option would not leave Polish negotiators empty-handed or risk the loss of further American influence in Poland. During a recent U.S. Congressional visit to Poland, such thinking seemed apparent. Polish media already take this scenario for granted.
In the case of the Polish government, the wait-and-see approach allows for a relaxed stance in foreign policy. As long as the decision over Missile Defense remains with Washington, Warsaw may seek to move relations with Moscow from a Cold War footing to a “warm stalemate.” However, real progress seems inconceivable. Moscow has traditionally relied upon Warsaw to drive a wedge between western allies, thereby checking America’s intensions in Central Europe. But Poland’s diplomacy of small steps and wide smiles may remove the odium of a Russophobe nation – something which undermines its position in EU. By seeking new ways of cooperation with Russia, Poland might also improve its dealings with the U.S. administration.
Indeed, it appears that a quiet withdrawal from the Missile Defense agreement would fit both sides. Sooner than later, however, the diplomatic dance around Missile Defense will finish. The United States and Poland may continue to pretend that business proceeds as usual, or make bold adjustments on both sides to pursue an unbiased policy.
Over the long term, however, the United States remains Poland’s crucial foreign policy partner. After NATO enlargement, the Polish foreign policy establishment has to come to terms with the way in which Washington views their security dilemma. A Polish policy of “give us more security” will never yield significant results with the United States. Instead, it will reveal Warsaw’s lack of influence on American decision-makers. This will undermine Poland’s relationship with the United States as well as its long-term security in the region.
By the same token, the Obama team would make a major mistake if it ignored America’s role in European security. The American presence, be it military or political, delineates West from the East and defines geopolitics from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Rather than providing a shield against rough states, Europe views the Missile Defense project as a vehicle for extending America’s influence on – and commitment to – the continent.
Participation in the Missile Defense system therefore represents status and power in a changing Europe – not just the security of allies. In this way, Missile Defense should be viewed, as W. Wohlforth has described, as “an existential threat to the status (but not the existential security) of other traditional Great Powers. To the extent that they prize status above material rewards, policymaking elites in other states may be willing to forgo potentially beneficial regional cooperation with the United States if it comes at the expense of their collective self-esteem.”*
For proponents of Missile Defense in Poland, tightening the alliance with the United States is a powerful vehicle for extending Polish influence vis-à-vis Germany and Russia. However, Russia views the project as a symbol of a new American containment policy. Hedging against the United States has been beneficial for Moscow and, regrettably, the majority of the German foreign policy establishment. The former Bush administration did not grasp the nature of the game early enough to protect its image and position in Europe. Will Obama also fall into the trap?
As Missile Defense in Europe becomes a tool of international politics, rather than a national defense program, the U.S. administration has room to adjust its policies. The real choice facing Obama lies not between a “hawkish policy toward Moscow designed to cater to East European fears,” or a policy of “resetting the button.”** From a Polish point of view, the United States simply needs to find a right balance between short-term policy goals (resulting from its current commitments) and long-term objectives (forging consensus on European security and stability in the East). Needless to say, both issues are interwoven.
As a result of these factors, several unanswered questions remain. Does Washington have consistent answers for organizing and managing NATO’s role in transatlantic security? If so, what does this mean for Medvedev’s proposal on a new European security treaty, or Germany’s policy of maintaining “equal distance” between the United States and Russia? Also, what role will the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy have in the security debate? Without a consistent response to these challenges, the Obama team risks making random policy choices that unintentionally create opportunities for rivals and estrange close allies. In this event, Poland might be tempted to swing between a policy of realpolitik and a form of European bandwagoning. Either option will produce further fragmentation in the transatlantic agenda. If, however, the U.S. administration is able to devote time and resources to answer these questions in a consistent manner, it will inject positive leadership into Europe’s east. This approach would create enough room for Poland to act as a critical U.S. partner in Europe and beyond. Such leadership will take the agenda of U.S.-Poland relations beyond Iraq and Missile Defense. That much is critical for the satisfaction and security of both countries.
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Dr. Olaf Osica is a research fellow at the Natolin European Centre in Warsaw, Poland.
*W. Wohlforth, “The Transatlantic Dimension," in European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighborhood Strategy, ed. Roland Danreuther (London: Routledge, 2004), 192.
** Ch. S. Chivvis, T. Rid, “The Roots of Germany’s Russia Policy,” Survival, 51:2, 119.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Center for European Policy Analysis.
Center for European Policy Analysis
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