The Specter of a never-ending Cold War
by Niels Annen
In his new national security strategy, Barack Obama defined his tenure as a transitional presidency that will leave Cold War thinking behind in order to adjust U.S. policy to the realities of a multipolar world. But as far as Russia is concerned, not everyone seems to be convinced that the Cold War really is over. Ron Asmus recently wrote in GMF´s Transatlantic Take series about the “specter of Finlandization” as shorthand for “a Russian policy that seeks to limit the foreign policy choices and sovereignty of countries on its borders.” Asmus seems to think that there is an explicit Russian grand strategy to pressure its Western neighbors into choosing neutrality over a Westward course that might culminate in NATO or EU membership.
It is certainly true that Russia’s relationships with too many of the countries in its Western neighborhood are still tense, but Asmus’ bleak analysis risks missing some significant developments. To begin with, countries in the region have increasingly chosen to determine their future through democratic elections. That was the case in Ukraine, where—not to everybody’s pleasure—Victor Yanukovich won an election that was widely considered to be the country’s most democratic. In Moldova, the communists lost their majority for the first time since independence in democratic and free elections. It is only fair to recognize that Russia established relations with all the candidates and accepted the results of both elections; so should the West.
Asmus does not explain what “Finlandization” looks like for individual countries in Europe’s Eastern periphery; in fact, he doesn’t name examples for countries that have been forced to choose “Finlandization.” Instead, he suggests that President Dmitri Medvedev’s proposal for a new European security alliance is merely a tool for a Moscow policy which seeks to re-establish a Russian sphere of influence in the neighborhood. Actually, it might be argued that Medvedev’s initiative (with a push from the Obama Administration’s “reset” policy) has opened the way to more engagement and discussions between Russia and its partners, including resumption of talks in the NATO-Russia Council and the OSCE’s Corfu Process.
Russia has done a great deal to improve relations with Poland, from an op-ed by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on the anniversary of the Hitler-Stalin pact in the Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza, followed by the screening of a TV documentary on the Katyn massacre, and culminating in a general outpouring of empathy and emotion after the plane crash that killed Poland’s leadership in Smolensk. Unnoticed by many, Russia finally settled a 20-year-old border dispute with Norway on terms that neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin were willing to accept.
Obama’s “reset” has been a success as well, establishing a new level of confidence between American and Russian leaders—as evidenced by the New START treaty, as well as Russian support for a UN Security Council resolution on sanctions against Iran (producing an unprecedented outburst by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad against Moscow). Russia is facilitating the supply of ISAF troops in Afghanistan through her airspace and rail system; even cooperation on missile defense no longer appears impossible. A bilateral U.S.-Russian presidential commission, working in 16 subcommittees, is contributing to pragmatic solutions and confidence-building. Finally, Moscow recently reaffirmed its commitment to a “modernization partnership” with Germany.
Surely, all this is progress, or at least a sign of a new attitude in the Kremlin? Given all the advancements made in the Western relationship with Russia, the question remains why there is a “specter of Finlandization” around and why one would want to beat Russia with a new strategy of enlargement?
True, Western enlargement policy has been a great success—a large number of former Warsaw Pact states today are members of the EU and NATO. Even on the European periphery, free and fair democratic elections are increasingly coming to be seen as the desirable standard.
But what could a new enlargement strategy provide—and without putting the progress made with Russia at risk? There is no doubt that the West is committed to “to advance our shared goals, especially in promoting democracy and prosperity in Eastern European countries” as the new American security strategy puts it. But Ukraine has just democratically voted for a president who is not interested in NATO membership. In the case of Georgia, where an increasingly irresponsible president confronts a Russian policy in violation of its international obligations, no easy solution is at hand. When analyzing international affairs, it is essential to assess the “world as it is,” to use again the language of Barack Obama’s new security strategy. On Russia, his approach seems eminently appropriate: “While actively seeking Russia’s cooperation to act as a responsible partner in Europe and Asia, we will support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia’s neighbors.”
German Marshall Fund
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