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EU-Uzbekistan relations: Energy issues vs. human rights

November 09, 2006
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By Monika Shepherd, ISCIP, Boston University

On 17 November, the sanctions imposed on Uzbekistan in October 2005 by the European Union (EU) will expire, unless all 25 of the EU member states are able to reach an agreement on which, if any, of the sanctions should be extended. The sanctions were implemented in response to the Uzbek government’s harsh crackdown on the May 2005 uprising in Andijon and its subsequent refusal to accept an international investigation of the events. The sanctions, which a number of prominent human rights groups have criticized for being too weak, include an arms embargo, a visa ban on a dozen Uzbek government officials, and a moratorium on high-level bilateral meetings. The EU foreign ministers are expected to make a decision regarding the sanctions on 13 November in Brussels, (1) where they are scheduled to attend a meeting of the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council. (2)

The European Parliament already has weighed in on the issue, in a resolution passed on 26 October. The majority of its members voted against extending the sanctions for an additional 12 months, although they did recommend that the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council renew the embargo on arms sales and military transfers. The resolution also advised the Council “to make a considered decision with a view to improving future relations with Uzbekistan,” while also stating that the EU’s relations with Uzbekistan "must be based on mutual respect for the principles of democracy, rule of law and human rights, as is clearly laid down in the EU-Uzbekistan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement" and calling on the Uzbek government "to cooperate fully with the OSCE and with the UN, especially with regard to the call for a credible and transparent independent enquiry" into the May 2005 events in Andijon. The Parliament also pointed out that, to date, the Uzbek government has not met any of the conditions set by the Council when the sanctions were first administered. (3)

Given the fact that President Islom Karimov’s administration has ignored all international requests for an independent investigation into the Andijon events and that basic human rights (to say nothing of basic civil rights) are being trampled in Uzbekistan at a higher rate than ever, it seems quite remarkable that the European Parliament would recommend lifting any of the EU’s sanctions. In fact, most of the press briefing in which the Parliament announced its decision reads as though it is a censure of the Uzbek government’s lack of progress on human rights issues, rather than a recommendation to partially lift the sanctions. The briefing provides no explanation for the MEPs’ decision, other than to state that the EU’s goal should be to improve its relations with Uzbekistan.

Following his meeting with President Karimov on 1 November, German Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier went so far as to all but promise that the EU’s sanctions against Uzbekistan would be lifted, in return for the Uzbek government’s firm pledge that it will improve its record on human rights. Uzbek officials are scheduled to meet with representatives of the EU Commission and Finnish and German diplomats (who will be acting on behalf of the EU) in Brussels on 8 November, where they will have the opportunity to outline Tashkent’s plan for improving the country’s human rights situation. Uzbekistan’s foreign minister, Vladimir Norov, already has pledged that his government will ban the death penalty and implement criminal law reform, and apparently his promises were enough to reassure Mr. Steinmeier that despite its many actions to the contrary, the Uzbek government is, in fact, serious about implementing genuine reform of its penal system. (4)

There has been a great deal of speculation that the real motive for the EU’s inclination to be lenient toward Tashkent is connected to the energy conundrum—a number of experts and political analysts believe that Russia and China’s growing appetite for Central Asia’s energy resources has Europe running scared. (5) Russia and China both have been courting the Central Asian governments, in an attempt to gain control over more of their oil and natural gas resources, as well as to influence their leaders against supplying more energy to other countries. Uzbekistan is thought to possess 1.86 trillion cubic meters in natural gas reserves, reportedly enough to meet Europe’s needs for four years, if the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project (this pipeline would link the European Union to natural gas reserves in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) comes to fruition. EU officials also are concerned about maintaining good relations between NATO and the Uzbek government, in order to retain support for NATO’s operation in Afghanistan and in the sphere of anti-terrorism, in general. (6) EU officials ostensibly believe that if they can curry enough favor with the Uzbek government, they will be rewarded with these and perhaps other concessions and that lifting the sanctions will constitute a significant step toward this goal.

However, there is absolutely no guarantee that allowing the sanctions to expire will elicit the compensation that Europe is seeking from Uzbekistan in either the economic or defense spheres. On the contrary, the EU’s willingness to do a sudden about-face in its policy toward Uzbekistan may cause Europe’s leaders to appear fickle, weak, and unreliable both as trading partners and military allies. By contrast, Russia and China may look even more attractive as partners in both commercial and military ventures. // ISCIP

Source Notes:
(1) Andrew Rettman, “EU likely to roll back Uzbekistan sanctions,” EUobserver.com, 31 Oct 06 via euobserver.com.
(2) “Human rights: Tibet, Guatemala, Uzbekistan,” 30 Oct 06, European Parliament Plenary Sessions via www.europarl.europa.eu/news.
(3) Ibid.
(4) “EU ready to ease sanctions imposed on Uzbekistan, says Steinmeier,” 1 Nov 06, Deutsche Presse-Agentur via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(5) K. Nordonov, “Democratic values vs economic pragmatism. EU sanctions against Uzbekistan may be stiffened or alleviated,” 27 Oct 006, Ferghana.Ru via enews.ferghana.ru.
(6) Andrew Rettman, “EU likely to roll back Uzbekistan sanctions,” 31 Oct 06, EUobserver.Com via euobserver.com.

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