CEPA: Russian Strategy toward Central Europe
By Jakub Grygiel, CEPA
Summary
Russia has never abandoned the desire to restore its influence over Central Europe – that belt of countries from the Baltic to the Black sea that has so often been the victim of Russian expansion in decades past. Lacking clear, defensible natural frontiers, especially on its Western front, Russia historically has perceived the need to possess some degree of control over its neighbors in order to erect buffers against real or perceived antagonists. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the weakness of Russia in the 1990s led to a retrenchment that was, however, never accepted as final in Moscow. What is surprising, therefore, is not that Moscow views the strengthening of the political and strategic independence of Central Europe with suspicion, but that it took it so long to articulate this mentality and act upon it. Looking ahead, we should expect a continuation of Russian attempts to weaken Central Europe through a mix of policies, ranging from economic pressure to political subversion and diplomatic isolation, with the ultimate goal of restoring Moscow’s influence over this region.
Introduction
It is common to assert these days that Russia is resurgent after a decade of peaceful interactions with the world. The bellicose rhetoric of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and other officials toward the Baltic States, Ukraine and even the United States tends to be greeted in Western capitals with a mixture of surprise, disappointment and, in some cases, self-criticism. The August 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia was seen by many in the West as an unexpectedly assertive (and according to some, defensive) move by Moscow that was motivated mostly by justifiable concerns with the leadership in Tbilisi. The premise underlying these views is that there was a time during the 1990s when Moscow was not interested, or did not act upon its presumed interests, to restore its role in the neighborhood. Back then, so the argument goes, Russia was pursuing a strategy of rapprochement with the West, both institutionally and economically. Some analysts conclude that U.S. actions, such as support for NATO expansion or withdrawal from the ABM treaty, fueled assertiveness in Russian foreign policy. Moscow, that is, is simply reacting to overly ambitious and antagonistic U.S. policies. Building from this premise, they argue that the key question for U.S. policymakers today is how to bring back the positive trends of the 1990s and firmly anchor Russia in the West. In part, the answer lies in changing U.S. policies and above all in avoiding any actions, such as building fixed military installations in Central Europe, that Russia considers as hurting her interests.
This paper starts from a different premise. Far from being drawn against its will into an assertive regional stance by U.S. and Western missteps, Russia in fact never abandoned its imperial aspirations toward Central Europe. Only over the past five or six years, because of a mix of high oil and gas prices and strategic distractions of the United States did it began to act upon these desires. In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow was simply too beleaguered to arrest its economic and political decline. Indeed, Russia was perhaps even lacking a clear understanding of its position in the region and of its strategic needs. But it is a stretch to argue that Russia was on track to shed its old regional aspirations and join the institutional frameworks that have united Europe for several decades and have been gradually expanding eastward since 1989. To start in that direction, Moscow would have had to renounce its imperial past and accept the idea of becoming just another European state. It has done neither. Furthermore, today’s Russian leaders consistently view the world in zero-sum terms. Any encroachment of NATO or the West in general, into the post-Soviet space is perceived as an automatic loss to Russia. Putin clearly articulated this vision when he said in 2004, if “Russia were to abstain from an active policy in the CIS or even embark on an unwarranted pause, this would inevitably lead to nothing else but other, more active states resolutely filling this political space.”(1) This paper will examine the strategic desires of Moscow toward Central Europe (defined as Poland, the Czech and Slovak republics, Hungary, the Baltic States and Ukraine); briefly look at Russian capabilities; identify the strategies that Russia is likely to adopt on its Western frontier; and outline steps that the United States can take to limit and counter Russia’s reach.
What Does Russia Want?
Russian foreign policy is characterized by aspirations of global stature achieved through regional domination. Over the past decade, Russian leaders have clearly stated that they hope to restore a level of prestige and influence that their country has not enjoyed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. To do so, they believe they must undermine the U.S. position in the world, from Europe to Asia through the Middle East. This goal is to a degree driven by the perception that it was U.S. policies, rather than a fundamental structural weakness of the communist system, that led to the demise of the Soviet Union. Moscow has never taken seriously the many post-Cold War statements of friendship proffered by American policymakers, and especially under Putin has always considered the United States and NATO as the principal causes of Russia’s political weakness and diminished geopolitical fortunes.
Nevertheless, Russian leaders recognize that, for now, they must avoid a direct confrontation with the West in general and the United States in particular. Russia has very limited global reach, either militarily or diplomatically, and an outright clash with the United States could impose economic costs and slow Moscow’s gradual restoration of influence in the Russian neighborhood. At any rate, it is simply not necessary to engage the United States in a direct confrontation; the goal of limiting U.S. global power can be achieved by hindering America’s ability to resolve some its most pressing security threats (e.g., Iran, Afghanistan) and perhaps by exacerbating them through, for instance, sales of advanced weaponry (e.g., S-300 surface-to-air missiles to Iran).
Under these circumstances, Russia’s main strategic focus is on its immediate neighborhood, where Russian influence is most likely to be restored over time as a foundation from which to sally into global affairs. This is where Moscow is testing the limits of Western tolerance for the return of Russia as a great power. What happens on Russia’s Western and Southern frontiers will determine its future role in the world. While the Southern frontier, especially the Caucasus, has recently attracted a lot of attention, it is the Western frontier – the area from the Baltic States to Ukraine – that Moscow is focusing its energy most, and where the United States, NATO and the EU have the greatest possibility of redirecting the path undertaken by Putin.
Russia’s goals toward its Western neighbors can be summarized in three points. First, Russia wants to regain control over Ukraine. Control can take many forms, and does not necessarily mean annexation into Russia or some other Russian-led political structure. More likely, Russia wants to achieve some degree of control by influencing the domestic political scene by rule through proxy and by neutralizating Kiev’s foreign policy. A fully independent government in Kiev that continues to aspire to join NATO is categorically unacceptable to Moscow. It is seen as a threat as well as a historical anomaly that deprives Russia of a territory of strategic and cultural importance. Moscow’s political elites, together with exponents of Russian nationalist groups, present Ukraine as the cradle of Russia. Kiev is where Russian history begins and Ukraine is more Russian than Russia itself, at least according to the narrative espoused by the current Russian leadership. Ukraine’s independence, therefore, is a dangerous aberration that needs to be redressed.
This view of Ukraine as an integral part of Russia applies also, to a lesser degree, to other former Soviet republics. Moscow considers this larger area as still part of a “privileged sphere” that does not fall into the category of foreign policy, but something more akin to the management of political dependencies. Policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is seen as a separate field of foreign policy, warranting its own government agency. It is doubtful whether CIS will ever turn into more than a forum for discussion. In fact, Putin has favored bilateral relations with CIS member states rather than the institution,(2) but it is clear that Moscow does not see the ex-Soviet republics as fully sovereign – or at least, as rightfully sovereign – international actors.
Second, Moscow wants to neutralize and weaken the security and foreign policy independence of the new, easternmost member states of NATO. Their strategic independence in general, and vocal support for the independence of Ukraine and Georgia in particular, is seen as a hindrance to Moscow’s ambitions in its “near abroad.” Their participation in Western institutions, namely the EU and NATO, brings to Russia’s doorstep economic and political systems that are deemed by Moscow to be anathema to Russian development and culture.
Russia cannot directly challenge the Baltic States and Poland because of their NATO membership. The goal therefore is to isolate them diplomatically and through energy politics.
Third, Russia wants to weaken NATO. Despite U.S. assurances that NATO is not focused on Russia and in fact is geared more toward “out-of-area” operations (e.g., in Afghanistan), most of the Alliance’s new Central European members joined the alliance exactly because it offered security against Russia. Poland is in Afghanistan not because of a keen interest in nation-building or in fighting Islamist groups, but because it wants to strengthen NATO and its commitment to the defense of its members. NATO is therefore seen by Moscow as an obstacle to its reassertion of influence and power in the region. The Baltic States in particular present a challenge to Russian foreign policy because of their NATO membership and the security guarantee that comes with it. As Putin defined it, NATO expansion was an act of “khamstvo,” an act of unnecessary rudeness that is difficult to punish.(3) The goal is not to destroy NATO but to make it irrelevant and divided and, with time, to erode its credibility as a defensive alliance. Russia’ ultimate long-term goal is to restore some degree of control over the ex-Soviet territories, while creating an isolated, weaker and vulnerable north-south corridor in Central Europe. This sphere of influence will not necessarily mean direct control by Russia, in large measure because Moscow fears a violent confrontation with the West. Rather, it will take shape as a de facto acknowledgement of Russian security interests: Russia’s neighbors will be forced to behave according to Russia’s rules. Medvedev clearly articulated these objectives when he laid down the five principles of Russian foreign policy in what is now known as the Medvedev Doctrine:
1. Russia recognizes the basic principles of international law.
2. The world must be multi-polar, which means that U.S. power needs to be contained and weakened.
3. Russia does not want a confrontation with any country, especially with the United States and NATO. (This is in large measure recognition of the weakened state of Russia.)
4. Russia will protect the lives and dignity of its citizens wherever they are. (That is, it will continue to meddle in the internal affairs of its neighbors {e.g., Estonia, Ukraine} with sizeable Russian minorities.)
5. There are regions where Russia possesses privileged interests, namely the post- Soviet space.
What are Russia’s Capabilities?
To achieve these goals, Russia relies on a combination of energy politics, political subversion and diplomatic deftness. These tools, albeit less confrontational than an outright military attack, are difficult to counter. As recent experience has shown, they can be very effective.
A military intervention, especially in non-NATO states such as Ukraine and Georgia, cannot, however, be ruled out completely. Russia is no longer the military power of Soviet times, but its ability and willingness to use force should not be underestimated. In the past decade, Russia has used force on several occasions – in particular on its Southern frontier (Chechnya and Georgia). It still has approximately one million men under arms and almost 20 million in reserve, with plans to modernize and increase capabilities. Arguably, the size of Russia’s military is not a reliable metric because of serious structural weaknesses. The demographic catastrophe that has affected Russia over the past decade has impaired its ability to generate sufficient manpower. A full third of its 2 million conscripts are rejected on health grounds, and in a few years there will be a shortage of new entrants to replenish the army’s ranks. Meanwhile, the lack of investment in military infrastructure will require a dramatic increase in the military budget – an increase which is conditional on high oil prices.
These disadvantages, however, have to be considered alongside two other factors, which are especially important on the European front. First, Russia is relying increasingly on its nuclear forces to deter potential enemies (namely, the United States and China). This heavy reliance on nuclear, especially tactical weapons (in which Russia has a clear advantage over the United States), creates a dangerous situation that could degenerate rapidly in the event of a confrontation over Ukraine.
Second, Russia does not need conventional capabilities superior to, or even at par with, those of NATO member states. Russia’s objectives are carefully framed and pursued to avoid a direct clash with NATO. Russia’s most aggressive policies are aimed at states like Georgia that have limited military capabilities and cannot compete with the Russian army. Russia’s military superiority in its neighborhood, combined with little interest and less ability on NATO’s part to counter it, gives Moscow a clear local strategic advantage.
Focusing on Russian hard power capabilities, however, misses the main set of foreign policy tools employed by Moscow: control over energy supplies, political subversion and aggressive diplomacy. Russia is pursuing what some have called “hydrocarbon imperialism.” By controlling supplies of natural gas as well as pipelines (and increasingly downstream assets), Moscow holds leverage over its customer states.
Ukraine is the most evident target of Russian energy politics, but Central European states like Hungary and Bulgaria are also vulnerable because of their heavy reliance on Russian natural gas. Despite attempts by these countries to find alternative sources of energy, Russia will continue to exert near-monopoly control over their supplies. Russian energy companies are all essentially state-owned and have demonstrated their willingness to trade profitability for political gains. An extension of Russian foreign policy, they do not operate independently of Moscow.
The second tool used by Russia to expand its influence westward is political subversion. This includes an array of activities, from support of local politicians favorable to Moscow (e.g., in Ukraine), to corruption of political elites (e.g., in Lithuania) and support for extremist or polarizing groups. In many Central European countries, there is a widespread fear that old networks of former Soviet agents combined with new Russian business elites are working together to undermine the economic and political independence of Moscow’s old satellites.
It is not hard to see why people are worried. For years, Russia has been working to build “dual governance structures” in former Soviet republics (Ukraine and Georgia, but also Estonia), in part by issuing Russian passports to ethnic minorities. As Charles King put it, “The visa clerk and passport officer, not the nationalist poet or tank commander, are the real agents of Russia’s ambitions in Eurasia.”(4) The presence of Russian citizens in Ukraine or Estonia who may one day claim to be harassed, discriminated against or under threat, will be used by Moscow as a justification to intervene or to meddle in the internal affairs of those countries. A preview of such an approach was seen in South Ossetia before the war with Georgia, and menacing signs of an analogous situation are evident in Crimea. As Medvedev stated, one of the key goals of Russian foreign policy is to “protect the lives and dignity of our citizens wherever they are.” Creating new citizens in neighboring countries expands Russia’s purview, undermining the sovereignty of those states.
The third non-military tool of Russian foreign policy is aggressive diplomacy. The overall objective seems to be to isolate the target countries (for instance, Ukraine, but also the Baltic States and Poland) and to make them more vulnerable to Russian pressure. This is being pursued in a variety of ways. Russia works actively to undermine European strategic unity. A strong and single-minded European Union (EU) would enhance the political leverage of Central European countries, making them more influential in defending Ukraine and strengthening their ability to withstand Russian influence. Russia’s main diplomatic pursuit now is to split Central Europe from Western Europe by, for instance, insinuating that the new EU members are reckless and irresponsible, and that their behavior will likely lead to a worsening of Europe-Russia relations.
An ancillary approach, connected to the first, is to acquire the support of select European leaders (e.g., the former German chancellor Schroeder, the French expresident Chirac, or the current Italian prime minister Berlusconi). By favoring bilateral relations with some European capitals, Moscow undermines the institutional unity of the EU and isolates Central European countries. The result is twofold. First, Russia builds up Western European support for its policies (for instance, Italy seems unconcerned with the growing Russian monopoly over energy supplies) and a de facto acknowledgement of the existence of a Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet republics. Second, Central European states are put in the precarious position of either continuing their solitary opposition to Russian advances or sacrificing their fear of Russia for the sake of European unity. Neither outcome is optimal for Central Europe, while both improve Russia’s strategic position.
Russia’s Time Table
Irrespective of its ultimate objectives, Moscow will be careful to avoid a direct confrontation with the West, exhibiting continued cooperation of some sort with NATO, short of joint military exercises. Intermittent cooperation notwithstanding, the goal remains the same: to extend Russian influence over Ukraine, and further west, to Central Europe and the Baltic States.
Russia’s westward push will occur for the most part under the military horizon. Even in the case of Ukraine, Russia will try to avoid the use of force. This reluctance stems in part from the size of the Ukrainian military, which, though incapable of defeating a Russian attack, could inflict serious costs on an invading force. Moreover, a direct military intervention by Russia would likely result in the split of Ukraine, with the Western portion continuing to fight and perhaps receiving support from its Western neighbor. Given that Russia’s goal is to maintain Ukrainian unity and control the entire country, it will try to avoid this scenario and will continue to pressure Kiev economically and destabilize it politically.
There is, however, a degree of urgency in Russia’s actions. The demographic picture for Russia is bleak. According to some analysts, in a few years the Russian military will be unable to replenish itself because of a shortage of eighteen-year-olds. Russia’s economy is frail, inefficient and heavily reliant on high energy prices to replenish state coffers. The political system is equally frail, centered as it is on the person of Putin, whose popularity and ability to impose his will on the various political clans and interest groups may not outlive him. Putinism, like other previous autocracies, relies on the charisma and strength of an individual.
According to all these metrics – a weak economic foundations, a dying population, an unstable political system – the future of Russia is in doubt. There is therefore an incentive to act sooner rather than later to restore lost influence and engineer a security landscape favorable to Russian interests. Russia’s long-term weakness, in other words, could fuel short-term aggression.
What to Do?
All of the non-military Russian strategies above are difficult to counter. Deterring Russia’s action toward her Western neighbors is unlikely to work because Moscow can easily deny its role in, for instance, fomenting instability among Russian nationals in Ukraine or Estonia. Furthermore, U.S. attention is, and will continue to be, focused on the Middle East and the Far East. Short of an overt military challenge to NATO, most Russian actions will attract little attention.
The difficulty that is involved in effectively countering Russian neo-imperialism, however, should not prevent the United States from stating its firm opposition to a restoration of a Russian sphere of influence over Central Europe. Indeed, the absence of a U.S., and more broadly Western, response to Russian advances in Ukraine, Georgia, the Baltic States and farther West, will only generate further demands from an emboldened Moscow. Last year, the lack of a strong Western response to the Georgian war was seen in Moscow as proof of Russian dominance in the neighborhood. This may encourage further actions in the region. Furthermore, the tacit admission by the Obama administration that Central Europe ranks lower as a strategic priority alongside the plethora of other security challenges facing the United States may be seen by the Kremlin as a window of opportunity to achieve its objectives in the region. The unbelievably clumsy way in which Washington rescinded agreements to install parts of a Ballistic Missile Defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic has contributed to the general sense that this region is being left alone, devoid of serious strategic options to shore up their resilience to Russian advances.
The United States, therefore, should remain actively engaged in the region, and should deepen efforts to build a strategic relationship with the new NATO members in Central Europe, particularly now that it has downscaled plans for a Central European component to missile defense. There is no compromise to be had in this region: it either continues to exist under the U.S. security umbrella, or it will eventually return to the
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Dr. Jakub Grygiel is the George H.W. Bush Associate Professor of International Relations at
Johns Hopkins-SAIS. A publication by the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA)
October 2009
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1 Quoted in Hannes Adomeit, “Inside or Outside? Russia’s Policies towards NATO,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Working Paper, January 1, 2007, 22.
2 Stephen Blank, “Is Russia Forging a New CIS Strategy?” Central AsiaCaucasus Analyst, July 23, 2008.
3 Quoted in Adomeit, “Inside or Outside?” 24.
4 Charles King, “City on the Edge,” The American Interest, Summer (May/June 2009), 64.
Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), Washington, DC
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