After Istanbul, a slower nuclear clock?
The failure of the most recent round of talks between Iran and the “P5+1” in Istanbul was hardly a surprise. To date, negotiations with Iran have made no progress in halting Tehran’s nuclear enrichment program, or in changing the dynamics in a deteriorating relationship between Iran and the West. But the experience in Istanbul highlights some important developments with implications for future strategy.
The context for concern has changed. There continues to be a fundamental asymmetry in Western and Iranian perceptions of the nuclear impasse. Iran is playing a very long game, with an extended time horizon that has been characterized as “strategic patience.” The West, and to an even greater extent, Israel, perceives Iran’s nuclear ambitions as a ticking clock. For those in Iran’s neighborhood inclined to see the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat, the question of how fast the clock is ticking is critical. In part, this is a technical issue, and here the trend in recent months has been toward a more cautious estimate of progress in the Iranian program. Even Israeli analysts now talk in terms of years rather than months. While negotiations have evidently failed to halt the Iranian program, and sanctions may only have an indirect effect, covert intervention on multiple fronts has apparently made a difference. This is good news for crisis management, but may do little to change the longer-term nature of the nuclear challenge. In all likelihood, Iran will opt to remain a near-nuclear power for some time to come. But even this nuclear-ready posture may have serious consequences for military balances, doctrines, and the strategic balance across a wide region, from the Aegean to Central Asia.
The negotiations in Istanbul underscored the increasingly concerted European approach to the Iranian nuclear question. Indeed, the European Union has long been in the forefront of Iran diplomacy, and a common stance on Tehran’s nuclear ambitions has been one of the few clear-cut foreign policy achievements at the European level. Baroness Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, was a visible presence before, during, and after the Istanbul talks. For American policymakers skeptical about the emergence of a united Europe in foreign and security policy terms, Iran may be a harbinger of more concerted and visible partnership. Certainly, it matters that a cohesive European policy coincides with what may be the top international security priority for the Obama administration – keeping Iran from going nuclear on its watch. Current Turkish policy on Iran is a less comfortable fit with European and American interests. Ankara’s Western partners are willing to see Turkey (and Brazil) play a facilitation role. But despite Turkey’s active diplomacy and closer relations with Tehran, there is little that Turkey can achieve if the parties at the core of the nuclear dispute are unwilling to envision a grand bargain. Neither Tehran, nor Washington will be willing to “outsource” diplomacy on such a critical security issue.
European unity and Turkish activism can only do so much. Given the patient, strategic nature of Iran’s quest for global “weight,” the relationship with Washington will always be central to the outcome. Sabotage and the threat of military retaliation may reduce the chances for an Iranian nuclear breakout in the near term. Over the longer term, the nature of the U.S.-Iranian security relationship is likely to be the determining factor in Tehran’s nuclear decision-making. The latest round of international sanctions on Iran may well be having an effect on the Iranian economy. But their effectiveness in hobbling Iran’s nuclear program, or changing the calculus about nuclear proliferation in Tehran, is much less clear. It might even be argued that effective sanctions will reinforce the regime’s perception of economic and military encirclement, fueling the desire for a minimum nuclear deterrent, whatever the cost. U.S.-Iranian strategic dialogue might alter this equation – but a constructive approach is hardly conceivable against the backdrop of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s inflammatory rhetoric.
Events in Tunisia show that the stability of even the most entrenched regimes cannot be taken for granted in the Middle East. Despite obvious differences of scale, and the character of the state and society, the Tunisian case may yet give new hope to those who would like to see systemic change in Iran. In the meantime, transatlantic partners, including Turkey, need to prepare for a an extended strategy of containment vis-à-vis an Iran that may remain poised on the nuclear threshold for some time to come.
Ian O. Lesser, German Marshall Fund
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